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Abstract:  Antimonopoly law provides exemption for the legitimate exercising of patent rights, 
casts regulation and control over the patent abuse. This article expounds the exemption subject, 
exemption condition, exemption occasion as well as exemption category, elucidates the relation of 
abuse behavior and antimonopoly law, puts forward concrete regulating approach on the patent 
abuse by antimonopoly law. 
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Résumé:  le juste exercice du droit de propriété industrielle est immunisé selon la loi antitrust, 
j’expose dans cette thèse l’objet, la condition, l’occasion et la catégorie de son immunité. Pourtant, 
l’abus du droit de propriété industrielle est restreint aussi selon la loi antitrust, j’explique la relation 
entre l’abus du droit de propriété industrielle et la loi antitrust, puis propose mon projet afin de 
restreindre l’abus du droit de propriété industrielle par la loi antitrust. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION  
 
As patent is a monopolistic right, the complex relation 
of the exercising of patent rights and antimonopoly law 
arises while antimonopoly law aims to cast blow on 
monopoly. Patent law consists with antimonopoly law 
on the purpose and function which aims to promote 
innovation and advance consumers’ welfare. 
Nevertheless, patent law also conflicts with 
antimonopoly law latently on the game and balance of 
individual interests and public interests. These conflicts 
virtually reveal the contradiction between the private 
interests of patent law and the social interests of 
antimonopoly law. In light of this duality, it is stipulated 
according to Article 64, Antimonopoly law of P.R of the 
China (Draft for examining),“operator who exercises 
legal rights in accordance with the rule of Copyrights 
Law of the P.R of China, Trademark Law of the P.R of 
China, Patent Law of the P.R of China is free from 
restriction, any behavior which breaching any of these 
laws or abuse of intellectual property shall be restricted 
accordingly.” All this actually indicates the attitude of 
antimonopoly law towards intellectual property: one is 
the exemption of justifiable exercise of intellectual 
property, the other is regulation and administration on 
abuse of intellectual property. 
 
2.  THE EXEMPTION ON JUST 
EXERCISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY BY ANTIMONOPOLY LAW  
 
The exemption on legitimate exercising of intellectual 
property by antimonopoly law is substantially a 
reflection of the internal connection of patent law and 
antimonopoly law on legislation. Owing to the 
consistence of patent system and antimonopoly law on 
urging innovation and advancing consumers’ welfare, 
Patent Law can effectively carry out its incentive on 
research and innovation, facilitate competition. 
Therefore, exemption is provided for the just exercise of 
patent rights by Antimonopoly law. 
 
2.1 Subject of Exemption  
Not all exercises of patent rights can be exempted from 
antimonopoly law. The subject of exemption can only 
be limited to the proper exercise of patent rights. Then 
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how to determine the criterion of “proper exercise”? 
The author of this paper thinks that when making a 
judgment about whether a patent exercising behavior 
constitutes patent abuse, we should take two points into 
consideration: first is the behavior is in essence an act of 
“exercising of patent rights”, second is the “proper” 
exercise. Only when these two points both meet, can the 
act be exempted from antimonopoly law 
correspondingly. 
2.1.1 The act of exercising of patent rights. First of 
all, the actor must achieve the legal acquisition of the 
patent rights. If the actor exercises some so-called 
“patented” rights without virtual acquisition of the 
patent or exercises it in the name of patentee without 
substantive patented right, or continues to exercising his 
patent rights after the expiration of the patent, it is 
obviously not the case mentioned above. Secondly, the 
act must be in the scope of the patent. If it is beyond the 
scope of legal authorization by patent law, it definitely 
doesn’t belong to “the exercising of patent rights”. The 
behavior of exercising patent rights refers to the 
behavior conferred by patent law serving the purpose of 
realization of economic benefits. Therefore, we shall 
take patent law as legal basis.  
2.1.2 Proper exercise. As to this point, the criterion 
is whether the behavior is prohibited by antimonopoly 
law or other related laws. The patentee’s exercise of 
patent rights may bring about restriction and adverse 
effect on competition more or less. But on measuring 
the legislative purpose of patent law, it is tolerable by 
antimonopoly law anyhow. Examples are negotiating 
using category, scope of rights, field of use, period of 
using and so on when patentee formulates patent 
assignment or licenses agreement. Those acts not 
violative of the principle of competition may be 
excluded from antimonopoly law. Nevertheless, if the 
patentee abuses his rights or departures from the 
doctrine of good faith and causes adverse effect on 
competition, his act should not be justified simply by 
the form of exercising rights, such as, tie-in practices in 
license agreement, set unreasonable restrictions for 
licensees, etc, that will constitute infringement of 
antimonopoly law. In other words, as for the recognition 
of “proper”, we shouldn’t judge from whether it 
conforms with the stipulations of patent law ex facie, 
but from whether it is inherently harmful to competition 
or whether it is against the legal principle of fairness and 
justice.  
 
2.2  Exemption Occasion 
Exercising patent rights would not necessarily cause 
adverse effect or restriction on competition. In fact, 
when patentee makes utilizations of his patent, the State 
is unable to interfere in the operation under the name of 
fair dealing for there is no harm done to the dealing 
order. Likewise, under the circumstances that licensee 
manufacturer is unable to sell, as far as the technology is 
concerned, the licensee manufacturer can be deemed as 
part of production line of the licensor factory, then the 
possibility of interference of antimonopoly law and 
patent law may require further deliberation. The 
exercising of patent rights herein refers to the 
substantial meaning of patent itself, therefore is far from 
discussion of exemption. Only when the exercising of 
patent rights affects market dealing, can we have the 
issue of maintaining fair dealing order. Therefore, the 
exemption system of justifiable exercising of patent 
rights by antimonopoly law is applicable only when 
involving market dealing.  
 
2.3  Exemption Category 
Comprehensively inspecting the legislation of various 
countries and regions around the world, exemption 
mainly falls into two categories: one is the exemption 
for practices that basically have no influence on 
competitions; the other is the exemption for those that 
are extralegal per se but have negligible impact on 
competition. As for the former, it can be reasoned out 
according to the fundamental spirits of patent law; as for 
the latter, a final choice is made after weighing the 
advantages of exercising patent rights and the 
disadvantages of competition restriction. Consequently, 
the exemption of proper exercising of patent rights is 
still the result of balancing interests in essence.  
 
3.  ON THE REGUALATING OF ABUSE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BY 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 
 
3.1 the Relationship Between the Abuse 
Behavior of Patent Rights and 
Antimonopoly law 
As to the relationship between the abuses behavior of 
patent rights and antimonopoly law, the core is the 
relationship between patent rights abuse behavior and 
competition restraint behavior.  
“Rights are not allowed to be abused.” is a basic idea 
in law. To avoid the abuse of rights, the exercising of 
rights should be restricted to certain extent. The 
exercising of patent rights is essentially the exercising 
of private rights, and then it firstly must be subject to 
good faith doctrine, principle of rights abuse prohibition 
and principle of public order and good moral of Civil 
Law. Secondly, as the fundamental law of patent system, 
mandatory rules as compulsory license and reasonable 
use are set to prevent patent abuse. Thirdly, base on the 
inborn “kinship” of patent rights and monopoly, the 
examining of its abuse behavior from the angle of 
antimonopoly law is also indispensable. Owning to the 
concept ambiguity of the fundamental principle of civil 
law, the applying field is not objective enough, and it 
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may cause destabilizing law application. Therefore, the 
regulating of patent abuse can only be auxiliary and 
complementary. Scholars discuss more on the unitary 
regulating mode of Patent Law, the dualistic regulating 
mode of Patent Law combining with Antimonopoly law 
as well as which should enjoy the application 
superiority. 
The author agrees with dualistic regulating mode. 
The reasons are as following: 
3.1.1 Patent Law aims to protect patents, promote 
innovation, accordingly, it has a inclination to 
emphasize the protection of patent rights, being unable 
to make explicit stipulation to patent rights abuse 
behavior; while anti-monopoly law realizes its 
maintenance for competition mainly through the 
regulation of anti-competition behavior, it is why its 
regulation towards rights abuse behavior are more 
concrete and more powerful  
3.1.2 If rights abuse behavior must be regulated 
through paten law, it must be patent office’s 
responsibility. Whereas, considering the manpower and 
professional experience of patent office, they seem to be 
skilled in the qualification of the technology applying 
for patent registration; while professional antimonopoly 
institution having the specialty to estimate of market 
influence caused by economic behavior. To regulate 
patent behavior incurring competition impediment by 
special antimonopoly institution could save law 
enforcement cost and enhance law enforcement 
efficiency.  
Certainly, it doesn’t mean that regulation performed 
by antimonopoly law alone is sufficient. There indeed 
exists abuse behavior being judged as rights misuse, 
which does not obstruct competition order. “Patent 
abuse” is usually the behavior which patentee intends to 
extend the rights unable to be endowed by patent law; 
but the prohibited behaviors specified in antimonopoly 
law have different constitutive requirement. In litigation 
practice, “patent abuse” conduct does not necessarily 
refer to the behavior prohibited by antimonopoly law; 
but on the contrary, the behavior prohibited by 
antimonopoly law may roughly constitute “patent 
abuse”. That is to say, “Between lawful utilization of 
rights and violation of antitrust law, many behaviors 
constitute patent abuse, though not enough to constitute 
a breach of antitrust law, for which they will be deprived 
of patent as a temporary punishment.” 2  Regarding 
regulation of these abuse behavior, they should be 
implemented through amendment and supplement of 
patent law, and the application interpretation of 
fundamental principle of civil law.  
3.1.3 In the nature of private law, patent law protects 
private interests directly; antimonopoly law, as public 
law, protects the overall social interests. Generally 
speaking, when private interests conflict with public 
                                                        
2 Arthur R. Miller& Michael H. Davis. Intellectual Property. 
West Publishing Co.1990,p,137 
interests, it’s the public interests that should be 
protected preferentially, namely the application of 
public law is superior in principle.  
 
3.2  The Regulation of Patent Rights Abuse 
by Antimonopoly law in China 
The stipulation in Article 64, Antimonopoly Law(draft 
for examining) of our country is virtually borrowed 
from the legislative experience of Japan and Taiwan 
Region of P.R of China, making principle rules of patent 
exercising in Antimonopoly law. 
Since antimonopoly law is incapable of making 
overall and detailed regulations on the patent exercising, 
it’s indispensable for us to borrow relevant experience 
from U.S.A, E.U., Japan, etc, that is, the antimonopoly 
law enforcement institution solve the monopoly 
problem involving patent exercising by setting special 
guidelines and rules and regulations according to 
different periods and specific condition. Based on the 
stipulation of Article 6, Antimonopoly law(draft for 
examining),P.R of China, the antimonopoly law 
enforcement institution in China is a special branch 
established under the jurisdiction of commerce 
administrative department of the State Council. 
According to this act, the branch is still an 
administrative institution, hence performs 
administrative power as before. Hereby the stipulation 
made by antimonopoly law enforcement institution is 
still administrative regulation in nature. In China, 
administrative code is one of the legal basis applied in 
court case inspection, this kind of stipulation thereby 
can not only be applied as guideline in administrative 
law enforcement but also applicable in judicial practice, 
even beneficial to the intervention and inquisition of 
lawsuit by court.    
As for how to normalize patent abuse behavior, the 
author thinks that, first and foremost we should handle 
properly the relationship between patent protection and 
competition maintenance from a guiding ideological 
angle, and shouldn’t be too strict in the delimitation of 
justifiable patent exercising while strengthen the sense 
of protection. The possession of patent itself is not the 
ground of monopoly position, even if the acquisition of 
market monopoly is resulted from patent acquisition, it 
does not necessarily constitute monopoly. It’s a 
common trend that many countries are loosening up the 
regulation of antimonopoly law. Through inspecting, 
the antimonopoly law legislation on patent by different 
country is on the loose to certain extend,3 and also have 
made multiple exclusion rules; secondly, on legislation 
mode, the exercising of patent rights can take the 
combination of generalization and enumeration, 
combining the general defining with specific 
enumerating, the method performed by E.U. and Japan 
                                                        
3 Wang Bingyin, Wang Jianfeng. Development and Evolution 
of Patent System: Technology Monopoly and 
Antimonopoly , Guangxi Social Science, 2004, Volume 3. 
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may also be introduced, which is to divide the patent 
licensing restriction into three categories so as to meet 
different means of identification and principle of 
inspection to facilitate effective and convenient 
regulation of patent licensing behavior; Thirdly, as to 
system allocation, the measure taken in Taiwan region 
may be recommended, an advance-notice procedure on 
monopolistic position is set to inform the enterprise 
when it has reached the monopolistic position so as to 
urge it to act cautiously and avoid any abuse behavior, 
hereby save unnecessary resource cost. Lastly, special 
attention must be paid that. the specific measure of 
antimonopoly law restriction on patent exercising is 
intricate and elaborate, while the borrowing of foreign 
advanced experiences, the general investigation to   
domestic situation is also indispensable. The legislator 
must give special concern and consideration on how to 
design corresponding system detail so as to suit the 
actual situation of China and get better implementation.   
  
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
From above we can conclude that patent, being 
monopolistic rights, is not necessarily violative of 
antimonopoly law. Antimonopoly law can tolerate the 
legal monopoly of patent,  thus it is immunized from 
antimonopoly law. However, antimonopoly law casts 
regulation and even blow on patent abuse which 
damages market competition order by means of public 
power, so as to ensure the balance of individual interests 
maintained by patent monopoly and social interests 
assumed by free competition. 
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